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COMPETITION ISSUES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS 
 
-- Contribution from Panos Kanavos and Olivier Wouters *--  
1. The pharmaceutical distribution chain is composed of manufacturers, distributors (wholesalers 
and importers), and retailers (public and private pharmacies, drugstores, online sellers, supermarkets, and 
dispensing doctors). In most developed countries, the various stakeholders in the supply chain are 
regulated extensively to improve the affordability and availability of medicines as well as maintain levels 
of service. In many low- and middle-income countries, the distribution chain is neither regulated nor subject 
to any formal oversight and, as a result contributes to problems of availability and affordability of medicines. 
In the sections that follow, we outline some of the key developments in the distribution chain in both 
developed and developing countries and highlight competition issues. The focus is on prescription-only 
pharmaceuticals (POM), as opposed to those that are available over-the-counter (OTC). Much of what is 
outlined below for developed countries is based on the evidence available from the European Union (EU). 
1.  Distribution issues in developed economies 
1.1  Market structure of pharmaceutical wholesaling and retailing  
2. In many developed countries, the supply chains are characterized by fragmentation, especially at 
the retail level. The retail and wholesale sectors are more fragmented in Europe than in North America. 
Still, even with Europe, significant variation continues to exist in the density of wholesale and retail 
outlets, largely due to differences in regulation, historical patterns, and service requirements (e.g. the 
public service obligation for wholesaling). For example, in 2005 there was one pharmacy per 1,250 
persons in Greece compared to one pharmacy per 20,000 persons in Denmark. The proliferation of retail 
outlets in some cases also seems to be a predictor of concentration observed in other types of services, such 
as the availability of OTCs and the types of outlets these are available from. 
3. There is a trend towards the horizontal and vertical consolidation of retailers and wholesaler to 
encourage economies of scale and scope in procurement and distribution. Horizontal integration refers to 
the fusion of entities that pursue the same line of business (e.g. mergers among retailers or among 
wholesalers), while vertical integration is the fusion of entities that have complementary business interests 
(e.g. acquisition of a pharmacy or pharmacy chain by a wholesaler or vice versa). 
4. Alternative models of wholesale and retail distribution, such as Direct-To-Pharmacy and 
Reduced Wholesaler Models, have appeared in certain cases over the past 5 years. This trend can alter the 
rules of the game, particularly in settings where wholesaling does not operate under the public service 
obligation. Through a variety of schemes manufacturers are in a position to bypass wholesalers and sell 
directly to pharmacies. However, these models are either limited to special products only or apply in 
specific circumstances when the regulatory environment allows. 
                                                     
*  This paper was written by Panos Kanavos and Olivier Wouters, London School of Economics. 
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5. Elements of diversification, particularly in connection with services expansion, by both 
wholesalers and pharmacies have been shown to exist as a response to some of the pressures on margins. 
1.2 Remuneration and incentives 
6. The mark-ups or margins charged by wholesalers and retailers can significantly increase the cost 
of drugs for insurers. Unlike the US or Canada, most EU member states implement margin controls to curb 
the pecuniary benefits captured by the distribution chains for reimbursable medicines; the distribution 
chain for non-reimbursable medicines is usually not regulated. 
7. Pharmacy margins are classified as progressive, regressive, or fixed (percentage or fee-based). 
The type of remuneration strategy will influence whether the pharmacists dispenses the lowest-priced 
option, which is usually a generic drug. Countries increasingly also legally require pharmacists to dispense 
the generic version of a medicine when it is available (i.e. generic substitution). Most wholesale margins in 
the EU range between 2% and 8% of the pharmacy retail price, although markups of as high as 24% have 
been observed in some cases and relating to a small number of medicines. The average pharmacy margins 
in the EU are less transparent, although a recent analysis of 15 countries estimated that the margins ranged 
from 12% to as high as 50% of wholesale prices. In North America, distribution margins are less 
transparent and are included in the list prices negotiated between manufacturers and insurers; additionally, 
they are thought to be lower, on aggregate, compared with margins in EU countries, although the trend 
over the past decade is for margins to decline in most EU countries. Pecuniary motivations may influence 
the behaviour of distributors and may lead to lower availability of certain medicines (e.g. generics, where 
the payoffs can be lower) in certain regions or countries. 
8. To obtain a competitive advantage, many distribution chain actors provide price discounts. 
Commercial discounts exist in many countries (offered by manufacturers to wholesalers, by wholesalers to 
pharmacies, by manufacturers to pharmacies, and in some cases by pharmacies to patients) but can be 
limited by regulation in some cases. While there are often legislated limits on the discounts wholesalers 
and manufacturers may offer pharmacies, the level and scope of discounts are kept confidential. This 
prevents policymakers to easily calculate the payoffs to different distribution chain actors. For generic 
drugs, the discounts can be high and are important predictors of market shares. If health insurers are aware 
of the approximate level of discounts awarded to pharmacies, they can try to recover some of these savings 
through clawbacks on pharmacy reimbursement. This is used in the UK and the Netherlands, while in other 
countries wholesalers and pharmacies are legally required to grant rebates to public insurers.  
1.3 Impact of distribution on prices of prescription medicines  
9. Analyses have shown that the price charged by the manufacturer (ex-manufacturer, ex-factory or 
list), wholesaler (trade or wholesale), and pharmacy (retail or public) varies substantially across Europe 
and across type of medicine (e.g. generic, originator, or OTC). The wide price spread at each level suggests 
that the effectiveness of various regulatory mechanisms differ. This price spread is more pronounced for 
generic medicines than originator products, and far more apparent for less expensive medicines where 
distribution chain markups represent a higher proportion of the price. In extreme cases, distribution costs 
and taxes can account for over 90% of the total price that insurers face.  
10. Several regulatory options are employed in high-income countries to enhance the efficiency of 
the distribution chain. Of particular importance are the remuneration schemes for the distribution chain 
players. As mentioned in the last section, distribution chain mark-ups and margins are often regulated. The 
financial incentives are likely to have a significant impact on the efficiency and extent of competition of 
the distribution chain. Ex-manufacturer prices are not always a good predictor of the final gross pharmacy 
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retail price, which is the price the payer faces. Therefore, more focus on the distribution chain and the 
make-up of drug prices is needed to ensure that appropriate regulation is implemented. 
1.4 The changing market structure and its impact  
11. The distribution sector is essential to guarantee sustainable access to high-quality medicines. 
However, it is important to ensure that the cost of distribution is commensurate to the added benefit of that 
these distribution entities provide to the general public and payers. As logistics and stock management is 
increasingly controlled remotely through IT, it is important for the distribution chain actors to innovate and 
continue to add value. 
12. Manufacturers are in principle interested in a supply chain that guarantees the efficient 
distribution of their products for the intended markets at a reasonable cost. As previously mentioned, 
manufacturers are experimenting with different distribution arrangements to lower drug prices. 
Manufacturers are increasingly attempting to bypass wholesalers and distribute directly to pharmacies 
where possible, or only collaborate with a small number of wholesalers whose behavior they can monitor 
and influence more effectively (reduced wholesaler model).  
13. Increasing competition and pressure on the wholesale and retail businesses are catalyzing a 
change in the market dynamics, with the number of mergers and acquisitions growing, including the 
establishment of vertical links with the retail business. In addition, the retail business is reconsidering its 
traditional role and services and is increasingly looking to diversify and expand the services provided. For 
example, pharmacies could engage in health promotion campaigns, monitoring, or clinical governance. 
However, it may be difficult to measure the additional value of these services. Pharmacies are also trying 
to engage more actively and directly with patients, for example by providing health information and advice 
(e.g. prevention, disease management, etc.). These trends are likely to continue as payers increasingly 
demand lower prices and that the most cost-effective options among equally therapeutic alternatives are 
dispensed. However, the willingness of health authorities to encourage the provision of these 
supplementary services these endeavors remains sluggish. 
2.  Low- and middle-income countries: background and issues 
14. In many low- and middle-income countries, access to essential medicines is reduced due to high 
prices, low quality, and irregular supply. Even though the average patient in these countries usually 
experiences low financial protection due to the deficiency or lack insurance, drugs are sometimes more 
expensive than in high-income countries. The issue of quality is also very pertinent. Interpol recently 
estimated that 30% of all medicines in Africa are counterfeit or of inferior quality. 
15. These availability and affordability issues are often the result of inefficient procurement 
mechanisms, weak or absent safety regulation, lack of infrastructure, bottlenecks in the distribution chains, 
little political and operational leadership by ministries of health, corruption, import duties and value-added 
taxes, excessive mark-ups, and inefficient or old national drug policies. A lack of coordination of 
capabilities generates significant waste of resources and reduces access. For example, procurement in 
China and India is carried out by public sector hospitals, private sector retail pharmacies and some 
governmental bodies. The resulting lack of coordination has led to inefficiencies, including the duplicate 
procurement of drugs. These inefficiencies are exacerbated by insufficient government investment, limited 
human resources capacity and financial support, irregular policy enforcement in the private sector, lack of 
stakeholder accountability, fragmented and discordant supply systems at regional level, poor information 
availability, a weak regulatory framework, and inadequate or non-existent transportation networks. 
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16. In countries with nascent regulatory infrastructures and/or weaker organisational capacities, 
inefficiencies in the procurement model and supply chain system contribute to higher pharmaceutical 
prices, inferior product quality, and distribution issues (e.g. stock-outs or only branded medicines sold 
instead of generics). Table 1 highlights the variability in mark-ups across settings, which are subject to 
significant variation across regions and private/public outlets. It is important to note that even where there 
are formal mark-up limits, actual mark-ups may exceed permitted levels due to corruption or lack of 
monitoring and/or enforcement. This has been documented in Ghana and several other low and middle 
income countries. 
17. Exceptionally high mark-ups can result in medicines prices in that are often much more 
expensive than international reference prices (IRPs) (Tables 2 and 3). For example, in Yemen, the private 
sector patient prices have been as high as 129 times the IRP. Oversight and regulation on margins across 
different market segments should therefore significantly reduce prices and promote more equitable access. 
Even moderate efficiency gains are expected to have substantial cost and access implications. Fuel Africa, 
a medical products distribution company, conservatively estimated that improvements to logistics and 
inventory management system could reduce total pharmaceutical expenditure by $162-324 million 
annually in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
18. To evaluate the performance of the supply chain and correct some of the aforementioned 
shortcomings, robust IT systems and data platforms are necessary. Better information availability would 
allow policymakers to examine determinants of the variation in availability/prices in public and private 
sector outlets across regions to correct inequitable access to services. Procurement models in low and 
middle income countries often exclude pricing or needs assessment, which is often not possible due the 
lack of IT. It is therefore advisable for governments to invest in data platforms to collect micro-level data 
to monitor the behaviour of the distribution system players. 
3.  Issues that merit further discussion and reflection 
19. A sound procurement and distribution system needs to guarantee a steady and timely supply of 
medicines, maintain affordability of retail prices of prescription drugs, safeguard quality standards, and 
ensure supplier accountability for the quality and reliability of their services. A number of issues arise in 
both developed and low and middle-income countries relating to the strengthening of regulatory systems, 
public procurement mechanisms, and public supply chain management: 
• Market structure and concentration levels: spatial monopolies are common and hard-to-reach 
populations usually experience diminished availability (i.e. inequitable distribution patterns, 
especially to rural areas). On the other hand, sources of fragmentation of distribution chains need 
to be analysed and their implications evaluated. It is also important to consider the regulations 
relating to wholesale and retail licenses, as well as who is allowed to operate pharmacies. 
• Vertical and/or horizontal integration at retail and wholesale level: wholesalers and 
pharmacies may accumulate substantial market power with unknown consequences for patients. 
While achieving economies of scale is desirable in a sector characterised by significant changes 
in IT and logistics, availability of medicines and sufficient levels of service should be maintained. 
• Remuneration and mark-ups: significant variation exists within the OECD area concerning 
approaches to remuneration (i.e. regulatory vs. market-oriented); by contrast, absence of any 
sound intervention or regulation may result in arbitrarily high mark-ups for essential medicines 
particularly in low and middle income countries. 
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• Safety and quality assurance: This is an important element considering the advent of e-
pharmacies and their sourcing of product. 
• Product quality assurance programs: quality control measures and labelling standards should 
be stringently enforced; quality control is often used to inform the selection of suppliers based on 
past performance (i.e. certified or preferred manufacturers). 
• Regulatory framework: policymakers need to define and implement more effective and context-
specific policies. For example, to discourage local monopolies and other distribution bottlenecks, 
including inefficiencies in storage, transport, and dispensary facilities. 
• Transparency: written procedures and annual audits with published results may be necessary as 
is regular reporting on procurement performance. This requires reliable systems of data collection 
and management to enable timely and evidence-based decisions. 
• Public or private models of procurement: mobilization of resources and collection of funds, 
pooling of available funds, and purchasing. This should be coupled with formal supplier 
qualification and monitoring. 
• Future role of distribution: many countries are entering phases of out-patient tendering; in 
these circumstances, the wholesale distribution chain may become a pure logistics provider rather 
than adhere to specific levels of service. 
• Discount practices: explore the extent to which these are competition-enhancing or competition-
reducing in a variety of settings. 
• Low and middle income countries: a greater body of evidence is needed to assess the 
performance of distribution chains and networks in different geographical settings, as well as 
study the extent to which policies or practices in OECD settings are transferable or generalizable.  
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ANNEX. TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1. Summary of distribution margins and taxes in a basket of LMICs 
Country Value (% of ex-
manufacturer) 
Stage/Purpose Comments 
Thailand 33-2000% Cumulative mark-ups Figure is estimate and subject to substantial variation 
28-41% Public sector facility mark-up Originator brand (OB) 
20-285% Public sector facility mark-up Generics 
37-900% Private sector cumulative mark-up Extreme variability noted 
7-31% Wholesale mark-up Generics 
0-2% Wholesale mark-up OB 
20-150% Pharmacy mark-up Generics 
13-40% Pharmacy mark-up OB 
Philippines 87-273% Cumulative mark-up Sector unspecified (public or private) 
3-5% National corporate taxes  
12% Value-added tax (VAT)  
China 4% Duty tax on all imported 
medicines 
 
17% VAT Only for pharmacy medicines; excluding public 
health facilities or hospitals 
Pakistan 25% Cumulative mark-ups Ex-factory prices for locally produced generics 
Morocco 10% Wholesale Regulated 
30% Retail Regulated 
7% VAT Regulated 
32% Custom charges EU imported medicines 
40% Custom charges Non-EU medicines 
Kyrgyzstan 44-63% Cumulative mark-ups Sector unspecified 
25-35% Wholesale mark-up Generics 
15-25% Wholesale mark-up OB 
15-25% Retail mark-up Generics 
5-15% Retail mark-up OB 
Yemen 57.44% Cumulative mark-ups Sector unspecified 
Ghana 177.8-246.3% Cumulative mark-ups Public sector 
27.35-387.6% Cumulative mark-ups Private sector 
66.7-185.7% Cumulative mark-ups Mission sector 
Nigeria 123% Cumulative mark-up For imported medicines from the point of landing 
till dispensing 
 44% Landing cost  
 8% Clearance fee  
 12% Inspection fee  
 13% Import mark-up  
 23% Wholesale mark-up  
 23% Retail mark-up  
Uganda 48.5% Import mark-up  
34.9% Retail mark-up  
1.3% Wholesale mark-up  
11.9% Import fee  
1.5% Clearing fee  
1.5% Customs  
0.4% National drug authority tax  
Source: Kanavos (2014, forthcoming). Author summarized the findings from the literature (primarily WHO/HAI 
evaluations of medicines prices). 
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Table 2. Private sector patient prices in a basket of LMICs 
Country Prices Comments 
India Median price < 2 * international reference price (IRP)* Excluded OBs 
 MPRs: 1.74-4.38 * IRP OB 
 1.3-1.69 * IRP Most-sold generics (MSGs) 
 1.3-1.84 * IRP  Lowest priced generics (LPGs) 
Malaysia OB 114% > Generics  
 Private sector OB 47% > Public sector OB  
 Private sector generics 60% > public sector generics  
China (Shanghai) Median MPR: 8.76 * IRP For 17 OBs surveyed 
 Median MPR: 1.77 * IRP For 20 LPGs surveyed 
Jordan 17 * IRP OB 
 11- 51 * IRP For 50% of the surveyed medicines 
 10.5 * IRP LPGs 
Pakistan 3.36 * IRP OB 
 2.26 * IRP LPG 
Yemen 2- 129 * IRP OB 
 0.26-18 * IRP LPGs 
Ghana 18 * IRP OB 
 2.04-7 * IRP For 50% of the LPGs surveyed. 
Source: Kanavos (2014, forthcoming). Author summarized the findings from the literature (primarily WHO/HAI 
evaluations of medicines prices). 




Table 3. Public sector patient prices in a basket of LMICs 
Country Prices Comments 
Malaysia OB 33% more than Generics  
China (Shanghai) MPR: 5.64 * IRP (OB) 21 OB drugs surveyed 
 MPR: 2.03 * IRP (Generics) 29 Generics surveyed 
Jordan 5.95*IRP OB 
 0.85*IRP LPGs 
Yemen 0.64-2.33 MPR 75% of MPRs < IRP  
Ghana 2.43 * IRP (LPG) 50 Medicines surveyed 
Nigeria 2-64* IRP Not specified whether OB or LPG 
Source: Kanavos (2014, forthcoming). Author summarized the findings from the literature (primarily WHO/HAI 
evaluations of medicines prices). 
 
